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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Gregg James Miller appeals from his conviction for injury to a child and felony
eluding.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Miller ended a dispute with his wife—partly centered on her desire that their son,
nine-year-old S.A.M., not be in the car with Miller because Miller had been drinking—by
driving away with S.A.M. in his car. (Tr., p. 83, L. 13 – p. 89, L. 18.) Concerned about
the way Miller was driving, his wife called the police. (Tr., p. 89, L. 19 – p. 90, L. 8.)
Officer Sanchez responded to the Miller residence and, while he was talking with
Mrs. Miller, Miller drove up. (Tr., p. 90, L. 9 – p. 91, L. 15; p. 110, L. 8 – p. 112, L. 6.)
When Mrs. Miller identified Miller to the officer, Miller sped off. (Tr., p. 91, Ls. 16-24;
p. 112, L. 7 – p. 113, L. 12.) Officer Sanchez pursued Miller, and activated his lights and
siren. (Tr., p. 113, L. 13 – p. 114, L. 12.) Miller sped away, driving excessive speeds for
the neighborhood and endangering pedestrians. (Tr., p. 98, L. 18 – p. 101, L. 11; p. 114,
L. 13 – p. 131, L. 25.)
The state charged Miller with felony eluding and misdemeanor injury to a child.
(R., pp. 43-44, 47-48.) The jury convicted him on both counts. (R., p. 107.) Miller filed
a notice of appeal timely from the entry of judgment. (R., pp. 122-32.)
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ISSUES
Miller states the issues on appeal as:
I.

… Did the jury instruction and prosecutor’s argument create a fatal
variance with the information?

II.

…
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct amounting to
fundamental error by appealing to the emotions, passions, and
prejudices of the jury, and by misstating the evidence?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Does Miller’s claim there was a variance with the injury to a child charge fail
because he has failed to show fundamental error?
2.
Does Miller’s prosecutorial misconduct claim fail because he has failed to show
fundamental error?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Miller’s Variance Claim Fails Because He Has Not Shown Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
The information charged the misdemeanor of injury to a child as follows:
That the defendant, GREGG JAMES MILLER, on or about the 16th day
of April, 2016, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did, while having
care or custody of a child, to wit: S.A.M. with a date of birth of
willfully caused or permitted the child to be placed in a situation that its
person or health may be endangered, to wit: by driving an automobile, with
the child as a passenger, in an aggressive or reckless manner and while
eluding law enforcement, all of which is contrary to the form, force and
effect of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace
and dignity of the People of the State of Idaho.

(R., p. 48.)
At trial the state presented evidence that Miller, with S.A.M. in the car, led police
on a chase that culminated in Miller being apprehended at gunpoint. (Tr., p. 98, L. 18 – p.
101, L. 11; p. 114, L. 13 – p. 132, L. 18.) Miller did not object to evidence that he was
arrested at gunpoint. (Tr., p. 131, L. 10 – p. 132, L. 25.)
The district court instructed the jury on the charge as set forth in the information.
(R., pp. 88-89.) The court also instructed the jury regarding the elements of the crime,
using the approved ICJI. (R., p. 96.) Miller did not object to the jury instructions. (R., p.
66; Tr., p. 146, Ls. 2-10; p. 148, Ls. 7-21.)
During closing argument the prosecutor argued that Miller had committed the crime
of injury to a child by endangering S.A.M. by eluding the police with him in the car. (Tr.,
p. 158, L. 1 – p. 160, L. 8.) In the course of that argument the prosecutor stated:
Not only in his driving here did he endanger this child. When he stopped
in that field and let that child run out of there knowing that the police were
right there, right there behind him, you remember Officer Sanchez pulls his
3

gun, anything could have happened. So this was definitely a dangerous
situation that he placed his child right smack in the middle of.
(Tr., p. 158, L. 23 – p. 159, L. 4.) Miller did not object to this argument. (Id.)
For the first time on appeal, Miller claims there was a variance between the charge
and the trial. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-9.) Miller’s theory is that the injury to child charge
was limited to his driving, and the instructions and argument expanded the charge to
include the officer drawing his gun. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8.) Miller’s theory ultimately
relies on a reading of the evidence and the prosecutor’s argument that is overly broad, and
fails to establish any of the three necessary elements of a fundamental error claim.

B.

Standard Of Review
A claim of variance asserted for the first time on appeal is reviewed under the

fundamental error standard. State v. Calver, 155 Idaho 207, 214, 307 P.3d 1233, 1240 (Ct.
App. 2013).

An appellate court will reverse an unobjected-to error only when the

defendant establishes the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) is clear or obvious without the need for reference to any
additional information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) affected the outcome
of the trial proceedings. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010).

C.

Miller Has Shown None Of The Three Prongs Of His Fundamental Error Claim
“A variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts different

from those alleged in an indictment.” Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 105 (1979).
To prevail on a variance claim, the defendant must show a “deprivation of his ‘substantial
right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury.’”
United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 140 (1985) (quoting Stirone v. United States, 361
4

U.S. 212, 217 (1960)). A variance is fatal if it amounts to a constructive amendment. State
v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 49, 89 P.3d 881, 889 (Ct. App. 2003).
A constructive amendment, as opposed to a mere variance, occurs if a variance
alters the charging document to the extent the defendant is tried for a crime of a greater
degree or a different nature. Id.; State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 566, 861 P.2d 1225, 1231
(Ct. App. 1993).
The general rule that allegations and proof must correspond is based upon
the obvious requirements (1) that the accused shall be definitely informed
as to the charges against him, so that he may be enabled to present his
defense and not be taken by surprise by the evidence offered at the trial; and
(2) that he may be protected against another prosecution for the same
offense.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935). See
also -----------State v. Wolfrum, 145 Idaho 44,
- --47, 175 P.3d 206, 209 (Ct. App. 2007). If a defendant claims lack of notice, courts must
determine whether the record suggests the possibility that the defendant was misled or
embarrassed in the preparation or presentation of his or her defense. State v. Windsor, 110
Idaho 410, 418, 716 P.2d 1182, 1190 (1985). The double jeopardy problem arises when
the evidence of acts not included in the charge would support a separately chargeable
crime. See State v. Ormesher, 154 Idaho 221, 224-25, 296 P.3d 427, 429-30 (Ct. App.
2012) (variance created by evidence of additional acts of sexual touching in single course
of conduct did not give rise to risk of additional prosecution).
Review of the record shows no variance. The misdemeanor of injury to a child is,
in relevant part, as follows:
Any person who, … having the care or custody of any child, … willfully
causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation that its person or
health may be endangered, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
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I.C. § 18-1501(2). The state alleged Miller created a situation where S.A.M.’s person may
have been endangered “by driving an automobile, with the child as a passenger, in an
aggressive or reckless manner and while eluding law enforcement.” (R., p. 48.) The
prosecutor argued that Miller “willfully permitted this child to be placed in a situation
where his person or health was in danger” because the danger was present “throughout this
entire course of incidents” including “spinning out of his driveway,” driving “40 in a 15”
and in an “aggressive, reckless manner while trying to escape the police.” (Tr., p. 158, Ls.
1-15.) Car chases “by their very nature” are unsafe, and “[t]errible things can happen.”
(Tr., p. 158, Ls. 16-22.) The prosecutor then made the challenged portion of the argument:
Not only in his driving here did he endanger this child. When he stopped
in that field and let that child run out of there knowing that the police were
right there, right there behind him, you remember Officer Sanchez pulls his
gun, anything could have happened. So this was definitely a dangerous
situation that he placed his child right smack in the middle of.
(Tr., p. 158, L. 23 – p. 159, L. 4.) The argument that the danger to the child, which was
created when Miller initiated a car chase to elude the police, did not end once Miller
stopped the car was not a variance from the charge.
Even if there had been a variance between the charge and the trial, Miller has not
shown it to be fundamental error. Miller’s theory is that “the State chose to specify in the
charging document the conduct it believed constituted injury to a child,” namely that the
risk of harm was caused by “reckless driving,” but the evidence and argument allowed a
finding of guilt through the act of “telling SM to leave the car when Officer Sanchez had
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drawn his gun.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9. 1) This argument fails to establish any of the
three prongs of fundamental error.
As set forth above, to demonstrate a constitutional violation Miller must show a
fatal variance, meaning one that effectively amended the charge and thus deprived him of
fair notice (meaning he was misled or embarrassed in the preparation or presentation of his
defense) or left him open to a risk of double jeopardy (which Miller does not claim). Miller
argues that the information did not provide notice of the allegation and defense counsel
“thus did not explore this allegation before or during trial.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 8.) This
argument is merely tautological and conclusory. Miller merely assumes prejudice to his
defense by arguing he could not have prepared for a theory that he was unaware of. He is
not, however, entitled to this presumption. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d
961, 979 (2010) (defendant must demonstrate fundamental error and “an appellate court
may not reverse” unless he meets his burden). Miller has not shown that he was unprepared
to meet the evidence of events succeeding his stopping the car or the prosecutor’s argument
that the danger to S.A.M. did not immediately abate.
First, the most obvious response to any evidence or argument allegedly exceeding
the scope of the charge is to object to the evidence or argument and request that the jury be
instructed to limit its deliberations to the charged theory. That no such objection was
forthcoming suggests that trial counsel did not feel ambushed by presentation of evidence

1

As noted above, the prosecutor’s argument was not that the drawing of the gun was the
situation endangering the child, it was that the situation created by the eluding was
inherently dangerous, which danger continued after the driving stopped, as shown by the
fact that at some point Officer Sanchez drew his weapon.
7

of events following his stopping the car or the prosecutor’s argument based on that
evidence.
Moreover, Miller specifically states that the evidence presented at trial “flies in the
face of the suggestion that the prosecutor made here—that Officer Sanchez drew his gun
while SM ran from Mr. Miller’s car.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 8.) Even accepting Miller’s
characterization of the argument (a characterization the state disputes), it is hard to even
speculate how a better defense than that the evidence “flies in the face” of a particular
theory could have been presented. Miller’s argument merely assumes that the jury
disregarded the evidence presented at trial and that his counsel was unprepared to address
a prosecution argument unsupported by that evidence. Because Miller has shown nothing
in the record suggesting he was embarrassed or prejudiced in the preparation of his defense,
Miller has failed to show a fatal variance on the record. Having failed to show a fatal
variance, Miller has not met his burden of showing a constitutional violation.
Miller’s argument that the alleged fatal variance is clear also fails. As noted above,
Miller’s argument that he was misled or embarrassed in the preparation or presentation of
his defense is simply that he did not have notice of the alleged alternative theory until the
prosecutor’s argument, and therefore of course he did not prepare a defense to it. He does
not, however, cite to anything in the record that would suggest he would have approached
the case differently. Miller does not contend, for example, that his trial counsel was
unaware of the substance of the testimony Officer Sanchez gave or what his video showed.
That trial counsel at no point claimed that he was surprised or that his client was prejudiced
is evidence that this newly asserted claim is not clear on the record. Rather than object to
either the evidence or the challenged argument, trial counsel instead addressed in closing
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argument the evidence of what happened after Miller stopped his car and S.A.M. got out.
(Tr., p. 165, L. 24 – p. 166, L. 15; p. 167, L. 19 – p. 168, L. 1; p. 170, Ls. 4-16.) Finally,
Miller also states that the evidence does not support the unpled theory he claims the
prosecutor asserted at trial. (Appellant’s brief, p. 8.) Given all these circumstances, it is
not clear that the defense would have approached the case differently. Nor is it clear that
the lack of an objection was not because the defense attorney strategically concluded that
the prosecutor’s argument merited no objection.
Finally, Miller has failed to show the alleged error affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings. According to Miller, the prosecutor argued that Miller “committed injury to
child in two ways—by driving recklessly and by telling SM to leave the car when Officer
Sanchez had drawn his gun.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) He argues that “although the
evidence at trial” does not support the second, unpled theory of injury to child, the jury
probably found him guilty on that theory because “jurors give special credence to the
arguments of prosecutors.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) This argument fails for at least three
reasons. First, it is entirely speculative. Second, it makes no sense logically to presume
that, where the state offered two theories of guilt, the jury rejected the one both charged
and supported by evidence in favor of the one not charged or supported by evidence.
Simply stated, Miller’s argument ultimately relies on the jury rejecting the theory supported
by the evidence, because if the jury accepted and found both theories allegedly offered by
the state then Miller was not prejudiced. Third, the district court specifically instructed the
jurors to decide the case based on the evidence, and that the arguments of counsel were not
evidence. (R., pp. 86-87.) Miller has made no effort to rebut the presumption that the
jurors followed this instruction. See State v. Folk, 162 Idaho 620, ___, 402 P.3d 1073,
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1081 (2017) (“We must presume that the jury followed the jury instructions in arriving at
their verdict.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)). Miller’s prejudice argument fails
because it is speculative, illogical, and contrary to law.
Miller’s fundamental error argument fails. First, there is no variance. Second, even
if the evidence and argument that the dangerous situation created by Miller did not abate
upon his stopping the car did vary from the charge, Miller has failed to show any of the
three elements of his fundamental error claim.

II.
Miller’s Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim Fails Because He Has Failed To Show
Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
Miller argues, for the first time on appeal, that the prosecutor committed

misconduct in her argument about the risk Miller created for pedestrians while eluding.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-14.) Review of the record shows his claims of fundamental error
are without merit.

B.

Standard Of Review
“When prosecutorial misconduct is not objected to at trial, Idaho appellate courts

may only order a reversal when the defendant demonstrates that the violation in question
qualifies as fundamental error.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979
(2010). To prevail on a claim of fundamental error a defendant must demonstrate (1)
violation of an unwaived constitutional right; (2) that the error is clear or obvious and lack
of objection was not tactical; and (3) prejudice. Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
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C.

Miller Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error
A prosecutor has considerable latitude in closing argument. State v. Severson, 147

Idaho 694, 720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009); State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 786, 948 P.2d
127, 141 (1997); State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14, 909 P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1995). He
or she is entitled to argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record.
Severson, 147 Idaho at 720, 215 P.3d at 440; Porter, 130 Idaho at 786, 948 P.2d at 141
(citing State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 110, 594 P.2d 146, 148 (1979)). Prosecutorial
misconduct occurs where the prosecutor “so infect[s] the trial with unfairness as to make
the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318,
127 P.3d 212, 221 (Ct. App. 2005).
The Idaho Supreme Court has reiterated the importance of reviewing closing
arguments in light of their improvisational nature, noting that “in reviewing allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct [the appellate court] must keep in mind the realities of trial.”
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes,
111 Idaho 423, 427-428, 725 P.2d 128, 132-133 (1986)). The Idaho Court of Appeals has
further recognized “[t]he right to due process does not guarantee a defendant an error-free
trial but a fair one,” and the function of appellate review is “not to discipline the prosecutor
for misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not interfere with the
defendant’s right to a fair trial.” State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 1002,
1008 (Ct. App. 1991).
1.

The Bicyclist

The prosecutor argued that a witness testified that he was “riding his bike down 6th
Street” and was about to cross Jefferson “when his friend who is behind him yells out for
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his attention to look out.” (Tr., p. 155, Ls. 9-14.) The witness stopped his bike “and that’s
when Mr. Miller passes him about 40 miles an hour.” (Tr., p. 155, Ls. 15-17.) The
prosecutor concluded: “If he had just taken a few more strides on his bike, he may not
have been here for you today to testify for you.” (Tr., p. 155, Ls. 17-19; see also Tr., p.
155, Ls. 19-23 (arguing that the witness testified the car passed about five feet from him,
and that was a “close distance” for a car traveling about 40 miles per hour).)
The prosecutor’s argument was supported by the evidence. Fourteen-year-old
D.H.E. testified that he was riding down 6th Street, approaching Jefferson, when his friend
behind him screamed at him to stop. (Tr., p. 97, L. 15 – p. 99, L. 17.) D.H.E. stopped,
“and that’s when [he] saw the car fly by.” (Tr., p. 99, Ls. 18-25.) Officer Sanchez testified
that Miller was traveling about 40 miles per hour at this point. (Tr., p. 114, Ls. 15-17; p.
121, Ls. 18-21.) D.H.E. described the distance between him and the car, and how he was
“shook up” and “petrified” by the incident. (Tr., p. 100, Ls. 1-19.)
Miller asserts the prosecutor’s argument was not supported by the evidence because
the bicyclist “would have been legally required to yield to cross-traffic.” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 12.) This argument is legally irrelevant, at best an argument for the jury (one in
fact made by defense counsel (Tr., p. 163, Ls. 3-11 (“the boys presumably know better than
to ride into a road without stopping and looking both ways”))), and certainly not
fundamental error.

2.

Proximity To Pedestrians

Officer Sanchez testified that he saw pedestrians while he was driving down
Jefferson. (Tr., p. 118, Ls. 11-13.) Specifically, he saw a group of two or three “kids” that
were “3 to 5 feet from the edge of the roadway” (Tr., p. 118, L. 14 – p. 119, L. 13) and a
12

“group of elderly people standing probably the same distance, 3 to 5 feet from the roadway”
(Tr., p. 119, L. 14 – p. 120, L. 14). The officer testified that Jefferson is a paved road
without sidewalks, and that he saw Miller’s car kicking up dust from driving at the edge of
the pavement. (Tr., p. 127, L. 10 – p. 128, L. 13.)
Officer Sanchez testified that, farther down Jefferson, Miller turned north on 3rd
Street. (Tr., p. 116, Ls. 18-24.) Ten feet south of the southernmost part of the intersection,
on 3rd, “right in the middle of the road,” a “group of kids” were playing on tricycles. (Tr.,
p. 123, L. 24 – p. 125, L. 17.)
The prosecutor argued as follows:
Do you recall the testimony yesterday, I believe that Officer Sanchez
estimated about the car came within about 5 feet of this group of elderly
persons that were standing outside the church on the roadway. About 10
feet from the group of children when he turned up on 3rd Street from
Jefferson. Those also were near hits.
(Tr., p. 156, Ls. 11-17.) Miller points out that the elderly people were not “on the roadway”
(apparently without contesting that they were within about five feet of the roadway where
Miller was driving) and that the children were within 10 feet of the intersection, and not
necessarily that close to Miller’s car. (Appellant’s brief, p.12.) These differences, Miller
argues, made it inappropriate to characterize these events as “near hits.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 12-13.) Such does not rise to the level of showing fundamental error.
Although more precise descriptions of the evidence are possible (by the roadway
instead of “on the roadway” and children were playing in the road 10 feet south of the
intersection where Miller turned north instead of Miller driving “[a]bout 10 feet from the
group of children when he turned up on 3rd”), the prosecutor’s argument does not rise to
the level of clear and prejudicial constitutional error. That these incidents were “near hits”

13

was within the considerable latitude afforded prosecutors to argue inferences from the
evidence.
Miller argues it was unreasonable to argue that the elderly people by the church
were a “near hit” because they “were not standing on the road and there was no testimony
that Mr. Miller ever drove off of the road.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-13.) This argument
fails for two reasons: First, there was evidence Miller drove off the road (Tr., p. 127, L. 10
– p. 128, L. 13 (Miller’s car kicked up dust when contacting the shoulder)) and, second,
the prosecutor accurately argued the evidence tended to show that Miller came within a
few feet of the pedestrians (compare Tr., p. 119, L. 14 – p. 120, L. 14 (testimony a “group
of elderly people” were standing approximately “3 to 5 feet from the roadway”) with Tr.,
p. 156, Ls. 11-17 (car “came within about 5 feet” of elderly people outside church)). Miller
also argues that “making a turn more than ten feet away from the kids on bikes cannot be
reasonably construed as a near hit.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.) However, if the children
on their tricycles (not “bikes”) had been playing on 3rd Street north of the intersection
instead of south of it, or if Miller had turned south onto 3rd Street instead of north, it is very
easy to imagine a catastrophe. Miller has failed to show any constitutional error in the
prosecutor’s argument.
Nor is the error clear on the record. The jury was instructed to make its decision
on the basis of the evidence and that the evidence did not include the arguments of counsel.
(R., pp. 86-87.) It is doubtful that the objection raised for the first time on appeal would
have been sustained and, if sustained, would have earned more than a reminder to follow
the instruction already given. In fact, trial counsel directly addressed the prosecutor’s
argument in his own closing argument:

14

despite what the prosecution is telling you, assuming that Gregg [Miller] is
going somewhere between 30 and 40 miles an hour, he’s probably not about
to suddenly spin out and hit a bunch of people that are standing on the
sidewalk, and I don’t think there’s any particular reason to hold against him
the fact that people tend to be outside in the middle of the day.
(Tr., p. 163, Ls. 5-11.) This argument to not accept the prosecutor’s argument about risk
to pedestrians is indistinguishable from Miller’s appellate argument that the prosecutor’s
argument was unreasonable. (Appellant’s brief, p. 13 (if the inference that there were “near
hits” was reasonable “then pedestrians are routinely ‘near hits’ when they walk down any
sidewalk adjacent to traffic”). It was hardly unreasonable for trial counsel to make this
argument to the jury instead of the judge. Miller has failed to show clear error, or that the
decision to not object and instead address the prosecutor’s argument with countering
argument was not tactical.
Finally, Miller has failed to show prejudice. He argues the evidence was not
“overwhelming” and therefore “there is a reasonable possibility this misconduct affected
the eluding verdict.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-14.) Miller again, however, fails to address
the presumption that the jury decided this case based on the evidence and not the
arguments. See Folk, 162 Idaho at ___, 402 P.3d at 1081 (“We must presume that the jury
followed the jury instructions in arriving at their verdict.” (internal quotation and citation
omitted)).
Miller’s argument fails on all three prongs of the fundamental error test.
3.

Injury To Child

Miller also argues the prosecutor misrepresented the evidence when she argued that
there was danger to S.A.M. after the eluding. (Appellant’s brief, p. 14.) This argument is

15

indistinguishable from the variance argument previously addressed. The state incorporates
its analysis regarding that allegedly improper closing argument here.
4.

Conclusion

Miller has failed to show fundamental error. The prosecutor’s arguments were
within the proper boundaries. At most Miller has shown minor inconsistencies between
the evidence and the phrasing employed by the prosecutor that do not rise to the level of
violations of constitutional rights; did not merit, much less require, defense objection; and
were not sufficient to show the jury did not follow their instruction to base the verdict on
the evidence and not on argument.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of conviction.
DATED this 4th day of January, 2018.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen___________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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